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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to investigate whether the key audit matters (KAMs) contained in the annual standardized financial statements 
(SFSs) of Brazilian listed companies have contributed with informational relevance for investors. The study fills a gap in 
the literature by evaluating the Brazilian market’s reaction to the disclosure of the information contained in the KAMs, 
which became mandatory for listed companies to disclose in their financial statements as of the 2016 fiscal year. The topic 
under analysis is of practical relevance as the use of KAMs in the independent auditor’s report is growing and expanding to 
other publicly-held companies in addition to listed ones. This study provides a contribution to the Brazilian capital market 
regulator (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários – CVM) and the Institute of Independent Auditors of Brazil (Ibracon) regarding 
understanding the impacts of the new auditor’s report, thus enabling the improvement and expansion of this mechanism. 
For the analysis, we use the event study methodology, which consists of evaluating how information influences the market 
in a particular period associated with the occurrence of a disclosure event. To do so, we used the variation in the sum of 
the daily abnormal returns of each company on the days that form part of the information disclosure window. The results 
of this paper indicate the consistency of the informative content of the financial statements with KAMs, insofar as the 
variation in the cumulative abnormal return of the companies analyzed is positively associated with the cumulative returns 
in the information disclosure window for the SFSs following the adoption of the new independent auditor’s report. Thus, 
this paper contributes to the literature by presenting empirical evidence of the informational relevance of the content of the 
new audit report containing KAMs.
Keywords: informational relevance, key audit matters, event study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Independent auditors play an important role in 
reducing informational asymmetry between agents 
inside and outside companies, especially with regards 
to the reliability of the accounting information disclosed 
by entities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) highlight the 
methods for reducing informational asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders, these being the 
independent audit, formal control systems, budgetary 
constraints, and the establishment of incentives known 
as asymmetry reduction mechanisms and an alignment 
of interests between managers and investors. Specifically, 
one of the aims of the independent audit is to reduce 
informational asymmetry, minimize conflicts of interest, 
reduce agency costs, and, consequently, increase the 
reliability of accounting statements, in order to improve 
the information in the corporate governance process 
(Piot, 2001). The main mechanism used for independent 
auditor communications with market agents is the audit 
report disclosed with a company’s financial statements, 
since its content can lead to economic agents altering 
their interpretations regarding company numbers. In this 
context, understanding how the content of the auditors’ 
report influences the users of accounting information is 
important for determining whether independent auditors 
fulfill their role in order for the market to function well. 
With the aim of increasing the transparency of 
the auditing process, improving the reliability of the 
information contained in accounting reports, and 
stimulating more solid interactions and communication 
between the auditor and the entity, the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) 
issued, in January of 2015, new requirements regarding 
the auditor’s report. These requirements were the result 
of pressure from users for the audit report to contain 
more than just an opinion of consent or not (Defond & 
Zhang, 2014).
Aligned with this international pressure, in Brazil 
the rules were translated and regulated by the Federal 
Accounting Council (CFC), in June of 2016, with effect 
for financial statements closed after December 31st of 
2016. Among the main alterations caused, there is the 
inclusion of the key audit matters (KAMs), the inclusion of 
a description in a separate section in the case of uncertainty 
regarding the company’s operational continuity, and a 
reallocation of the order of the paragraphs in the audit 
report, transferring, for example, the opinion section from 
the end to the beginning of the report (introduced by 
Brazilian Accounting Standards (NBC TA) 260, 570, 700, 
701, 705, and 706 [Federal Accounting Council {CFC}, 
2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016a, 2016f]).
The IAASB considers the new audit report to be a 
highly relevant change, since its aim is to disclose specific 
aspects of each entity, provide greater transparency to the 
process for external users, as well as creating an informative 
link between auditors and investors, highlighting the 
most important information out of all that disclosed 
by management to the accounting statement users. In 
addition, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB, 2013) commented that KAMs are 
expected to improve the informative capacity of audit 
reports by focusing the users’ analysis on the most relevant 
items for decision making. 
In this context, the aim of this paper is to investigate 
whether the KAMs contained in the new audit report 
of Brazilian listed companies has actually increased the 
informational relevance for financial statement users who 
make investment decisions. 
The literature has, for quite some time, addressed 
the discussion regarding the audit report being more 
communicative with relevant information for users. Some 
researchers analyze the effect that the extended audit 
report would have for users. In Poland, for example, 
an additional report is issued by auditors, containing 
relevant information for shareholders (Dobija, Cieslak 
& Iwuć, 2013).
Some studies argue that this measure would not 
increase the quality of users’ decisions. Vanstraelen, 
Schelleman, Meuwissen, and Hofmann (2012) state that 
this report would only provide benefits if it included 
information that was actually relevant for users. For 
Defond and Zhang (2014), the desired investor perception 
is that the audit report contains relevant information with 
specific characteristics for each company. 
In Brazil, the new standard for the report applies 
to audits of whole sets of financial statements of listed 
entities. KAMs are issues that, in the auditor’s professional 
judgement, required important attention at the time of 
carrying out the audit. KAMs are chosen based on topics 
communicated to those responsible for governance and 
determined taking into consideration the areas of greatest 
risk. When describing the KAMs in a report, the auditor 
is obliged to include the reason for which an issue was 
considered to be a KAM and how the auditor dealt with 
the subject [NBC TA 701 (CFC, 2016e)].
Brazil is a good case for analysis, given that the 
mandatory KAM disclosure came into effect as of the 
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2016 fiscal year, allowing for an initial empirical analysis 
regarding the subject. To exemplify, the 2016 audit report 
of Natura Cosméticos S.A., a Brazilian publicly-held 
company, had three KAMs, and one dealt specifically 
with the company’s difficulty in defining an appropriate 
time for recognizing revenue in accordance with the 
practices adopted in Brazil. Before, information such as 
this was discussed between the auditors and management; 
however, it was not taken to the public. It is thus expected 
that KAMs will often provide qualitative or quantitative 
information regarding a particular subject and influence 
decision making. Therefore, it is conjectured that financial 
statements accompanied by KAMs should provide the 
market with more relevant information.
For this study, the event study methodology was used 
to understand the importance of the effects of disclosing 
financial statements with an auditor’s report containing 
KAMs on the cumulative abnormal return of the stocks 
of the companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange 
(Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão – B3). Recent studies, such as that 
of Lennox, Schmidt, and Thompson (2018), use a similar 
methodology to evaluate the reaction of investors due 
to the mandatory disclosure of the risks of material 
misstatements in the financial statements of companies 
from the United Kingdom.
The sample in this study is composed of Brazilian 
companies whose stocks are traded on the B3. The data 
are secondary and were captured in Economatica, on the 
website of the Brazilian capital market regulator (CVM), 
and on the companies’ investor relations websites. We 
consider returns from January of 2015 to March of 2018, 
with the aim of capturing the impacts of the information 
disclosed relating to 2015, 2016, and 2017. The new audit 
report and disclosure of KAMs became mandatory in 
2016.
The results of our investigation indicate that the 
disclosure of KAMs made the coefficient that indicates 
the relationship between the variation in the cumulative 
abnormal returns in the disclosure window for standardized 
financial statements (SFSs) (which contain KAMs) and 
the variation in the company’s annual abnormal returns 
had an incremental positive association in relation to 
the association between the other financial information 
(mandatory and voluntary) and the variation in returns 
in the same period. This indicates, even if preliminarily, 
that the adoption of KAMs has provided some informative 
content to the Brazilian capital market.
In theoretical terms, this paper contributes to the 
referential framework regarding the topic, by analyzing 
a recent adoption scenario with a model that seeks 
to measure the informational relevance for investors, 
capturing this result using the abnormal return on the 
stock. This paper stands out from the studies already 
carried out on the subject, since it analyzes the market’s 
behavior on receiving particular information. Most of 
the studies have focused on KAMs and their impacts 
on the auditor’s responsibility, while those that have 
analyzed their informational relevance have been based 
on questionnaires mostly applied to a non-investor public 
(Brown, Majors & Peecher, 2014; Brasel, Doxey, Grenier 
& Reffett, 2016; Christensen, Glover & Wolfe, 2014). In a 
recent study, Sirois, Bédard, and Bera (2018) investigated 
how the adoption of KAMs affects the attention of 
financial statement users, using an eye-tracking system 
in an experiment with post-graduate accounting students. 
In practical terms, this paper contributes to the 
capital market regulator (CVM) and to the Institute of 
Independent Auditors of Brazil (Ibracon) with regards 
to the regulation and refinement of KAMs in order 
to improve informational transfer. Finally, this paper 
contributes to auditors by evaluating the impact of the 
adoption of KAMs in the Brazilian market. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the 
theoretical framework regarding the subject, section 
3 discusses the methodology applied, the results are 
presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Informational Asymmetry, Disclosure, and 
its Benefits
Lopes and Martins (2005) highlight that “the emergence 
of the modern corporation with ownership separated from 
management has created the possibility for conflicts of 
interest arising between shareholders and managers”. 
The agency relationship consists of signed contracts, 
with a complex structure that outlines the rights of the 
involved parties, between the owners of the economic 
resources (principal) and the managers (agents) hired 
to control these resources, to whom decision-making 
power is delegated (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Verrecchia 
(2001) argues that informational asymmetry inhibits 
investment, thus making the cost of third-party capital 
more expensive for companies. 
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According to Healy and Palepu (2001), the search for 
disclosure derives from the informational differences and 
the agency divergences between managers and investors, 
and some evidence leads to the belief that there is an 
opposing relationship between disclosure and asymmetry 
(Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Heflin, Shaw & Wild, 2005). 
According to Souza (1995), disclosure consists of 
making a company’s quantitative or qualitative information 
public to the market, by requirement or voluntarily, 
through any means of communication, whether formal 
or informal. This is so important that some studies relate 
stock returns with the level of company disclosure (Ball 
& Shivakumar, 2008; Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther, 2010; 
Locatelli, 2016; Malaquias & Lemes, 2015; Takamatsu, 
Lamounier & Colauto, 2008).
With the aim of minimizing asymmetry, Brazilian 
publicly-held companies have to disclose all information 
that is considered relevant through immediate 
communication to the CVM, thus leading to this 
information being filed in the institution’s public database. 
The necessary disclosure of situations that are considered 
relevant aims to prevent undue privileged access to 
information (Reiter & Procianoy, 2013).
According to art. 2 of CVM Instruction n. 
358/2002 (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários [CVM], 
2002), the following is considered a relevant act or fact:
any decision of the controlling shareholder, deliberation in a 
general meeting or by the management bodies of a publicly-
held company, or any act or fact of a political-administrative, 
technical, business, or economic-financial nature that may 
influence the quotation price of the company’s securities or 
investors’ decisions.
Recently, Costa, Galdi, Motoki, and Sanchez (2016) 
demonstrated that companies that did not disclose the 
remuneration of their executives had a higher information 
asymmetry cost in the Brazilian market, indicated by a 
greater bid-ask spread, in relation to those that did disclose. 
In this context, the CVM establishes that companies have 
to disclose annual and quarterly financial statements 
together with their independent auditor’s report.
2.1.1 New audit report and independent audit 
Audits are valued for their ability to provide an 
independent guarantee of the credibility of accounting 
information and they are of the upmost importance to 
minimize the agency theory. Yet, the waves of accounting 
irregularities have led to questions regarding the 
independence of auditors (Ghosh & Moon, 2005).
These questions have been raised due to the bankruptcies 
of companies that were renowned in the market, such 
as Enron Corporation (Porter & Gowthorpe, 2004), 
which filed for bankruptcy after adjusting its accounts, 
which received an unmodified opinion from its auditor, 
Arthur Andersen LLP. Similar results have been noted in 
companies such as WorldCom, Global Crossing Limited, 
and Rank Xerox in the United States of America. In Italy, 
Parmalat S.p.A. entered into bankruptcy in 2003, after 
involvement in an accounting scandal (Demaki, 2011).
Even with the irregularities found, independent 
auditors are considered the “guardians” of the public 
securities markets and, therefore, auditor independence 
is needed due to the fact that the impact is directly linked 
to the quality of the audit (Ghosh & Moon, 2005). The 
four dimensions that enable the impact of the auditor’s 
independence over the quality of the audit to be evaluated 
are: the importance of the client, non-auditing services, 
the auditor’s tenure, and the client’s relationship with the 
auditing firms (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015).
Defond and Zhang (2014) state that the growing 
potential for corporate transactions and the increase in 
the complexity of accounting judgements that involve a 
company’s day-to-day constantly corroborate the new 
positioning of auditing firms; however, a new positioning 
of auditing firms is not enough, and reflection on the 
informational relevance of the audit report is also required.
The form, content, and value to investors of the audit 
report have been quite widely criticized (Carson et al., 
2013). Auditors have been criticized for using very 
standardized language, for not explaining how they have 
reached the opinion provided in the audit report, and for 
not sufficiently communicating with the people whose 
interest they should protect – shareholders and potential 
investors (Cordoş & Fülöp, 2015).
For Defond and Zhang (2014), audits cannot be merely 
seen as certification that there are no relevant errors or 
misstatements in the accounting statements, but also 
that the financial statements economically reflect the 
company’s situation.
In light of this, in 2013, via a public consultation 
with the users of audit reports, the IAASB verified a 
series of requests to alter the model that was being used. 
“In general, these consultations revealed the desire for 
accounting statements to be clearer and more transparent, 
as well for the audit report to be more specific and less 
generic” (Ibracon, 2013).
Longo (2017) notes that financial information users 
sought significant alterations in order to cover additional 
aspects, going beyond a mere opinion regarding the 
accounting and legal standards and structural questions, 
making clear how these aspects influence the entity.
Therefore, the main item included in the IAASB’s 
final proposal is the disclosure of key audit matters 
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(KAMs), which aim to disclose a paragraph with the 
most significant subjects, including the reason for which 
the auditor considered each one to be a KAM and what 
treatment was given to the point during the course 
of the audit work [NBC TA 701 (CFC, 2016e)]. The 
new standards were adapted and regulated by the CFC 
in 2016, with effect for accounting statements closed 
after December 31st of 2016. The auditor’s obligation to 
communicate KAMs was introduced by NBC TA 701, 
of June 17th of 2016 (CFC, 2016e), issued by the CFC. In 
addition, NBC TA 700, of June 17th of 2016 (CFC, 2016d), 
introduces, in paragraph 30, the need to communicate 
KAMs in the auditor’s report in the case of audits of 
complex sets of accounting statements for general 
purposes of listed entities. A study conducted in Brazil 
relating to the first year of adoption demonstrates that 
all financial institutions successfully carried out all the 
alterations foreseen in NBC TA 701 (CFC, 2016e; Silva 
& Dantas, 2018).
Although this additional disclosure is expected to 
increase the informational content of the audit report for 
investors (Christensen et al., 2014), various interest groups 
have expressed their concern that KAMs also increase the 
responsibility risks of the auditing team (Deloitte, 2013).
According to Cordoş and Fülöp (2015), KAMs 
strengthen the theory of inspired confidence because 
they provide users with relevant information for decision 
making. Gimbar, Hasen, and Ozlanski (2016) argue 
that these changes have a significant impact in terms of 
increasing the auditor’s responsibility and should lead 
auditors to increase the value of their auditing work, 
since they will have to expand the auditing procedures 
for risk minimization. Brown et al. (2014) state that the 
auditor’s responsibility is reduced when a disclosed KAM 
is related to a topic in which fraud had been found at 
some previous moment. 
In France, since 2003 there have been audit explanations 
similar to KAMs. Bédard, Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt 
(2014) state that the disclosure of such information has 
more symbolic than informational value.
Christensen et al. (2014) state that investors who 
receive a KAM paragraph are more likely to change their 
investment decisions than those who receive a standard 
audit report. It was also found that the paragraph with the 
resolution given by the auditor influences the decisions of 
an investor differently from a KAM without the auditor’s 
treatments. According to Köhler, Ratzinger-Sakel, and 
Theis (2016), the KAM section for non-professional 
investors has no communicative value, which is explained 
by the difficulty of processing the information conveyed.
A company’s disclosure level can affect the trading 
value and volume of its stocks. The content of the audit 
report indirectly increases or decreases the will of investors 
to invest (Elliott, Fanning & Peecher, 2016). Based on this 
assumption, together with the KAM section included in 
the audit report, the following research hypothesis is built:
H1: the disclosure of KAMs in financial statements has informational 
content and is relevant in investors’ judgements, thus causing an 
increase in the association between the accounting information 
and the return on the stocks of publicly-held corporations.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Structure of the Study
With the aim of evaluating the impact of the 
informational relevance of KAMs on the perception of the 
stock market in Brazil, a quantitative study was employed, 
gathering data on all the stocks listed as active on the 
B3 and the dates of all the disclosure events, whether 
mandatory or voluntary, as listed in Table 1. The data used 
are secondary and were collected from the Economatica 
database and the CVM website for the period between 
01/01/2015 and 03/29/2018.
To capture the impact of the informational relevance of 
the KAMs over the stock returns of the companies listed 
on the B3, the event study methodology was used, which 
consists of evaluating how the information influences the 
market at a particular moment. Thus, the sum of the daily 
abnormal returns of each company on the days that form 
part of the event window was used. The event window 
considered was one day before the event, the day of the 
event, and one day after the event, as according to Beyer 
et al. (2010).
Disclosure theory segregates disclosed information 
into basically two groups: mandatory and voluntary. 
Mandatory disclosures are regulated by a rule that obliges 
the company to disclose certain facts to the market, for 
example: accounting statements and a change of directors. 
Voluntary disclosures, in turn, is information that the 
company judges necessary to disclose, but that is not 
required by any rule. To apply the statistical model, the 
event of disclosure of the annual SFSs and of the quarterly 
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information (QI) was separated from the other mandatory 
disclosures. 
The CVM makes available the information disclosed 
by publicly-held companies. The CVM itself classifies 
this information by categories on its website. To apply 
the statistical model, an analysis was carried out of each 
one of the categories and then a classification was made 
between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure, 
in accordance with the legislation in effect. Table 1 presents 
the classification of those categories used in this study. 
Table 1
Category classification 
Category Type
Assembly Mandatory
Board meeting Mandatory
Bylaw Mandatory
Code of conduct Mandatory
Communication regarding transaction between related parties Mandatory
Communication to the market Partial
Corporate groupings agreement Mandatory
Corporate events calendar Voluntary
Credit securitization and amendments term Mandatory
Debenture deeds and amendments Mandatory
Dividends policy Mandatory
Economic-financial data Mandatory
Information on companies in bankruptcy Mandatory
Information on companies in judicial and extrajudicial recovery Mandatory
Information on companies in liquidation Mandatory
Information on shareholder agreements foreseen in 
art. 30 (XIX) of CVM Instruction n. 480/2009 (CVM, 2009) 
Mandatory
Information provided to foreign exchanges Voluntary
Notice to debenture holders Voluntary
Notice to shareholders Voluntary
Policy for disclosure of relevant acts or facts Mandatory
Policy for trading company shares Mandatory
Policy for transactions between related parties Mandatory
Public offering documents Mandatory
Registration details of incentivized companies Mandatory
Relevant fact Mandatory
Resolution issued by the Central Bank Mandatory
Risk management policy Voluntary
Shareholders agreement Mandatory
Statutory internal regulation of the auditing committee Mandatory
Stock-based compensation plan Mandatory
Stock-based compensation plan (except options plan) Mandatory
Sustainability report Voluntary
TB – Public takeover bid Mandatory
Traded and held securities
(art. 11 of CVM Instruction n. 358/2002) (CVM, 2002)
Mandatory
Unsponsored BDR – Operational description of the program Voluntary
BDR = Brazilian depositary receipt; TB = takeover bid.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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The “communication to the market” category has been 
classified as partial, since there are information types 
in this category that can be classified as mandatory or 
voluntary. Therefore, each one of the information types 
of these categories was analyzed, manually classifying 
them for statistical modeling purposes. In the “economic-
financial data” category, the information relating to the 
disclosure of the SFS was separated from that of the QI. 
Table 2 presents the set of information that composes the 
disclosure of the SFS and of the QI.
Table 2
Quarterly information (QI) vs. standardized financial statements (SFSs)
Information disclosed QI SFSs
Balance sheet Yes Yes
Cash flow statement Yes Yes
Comprehensive income statement Yes Yes
Income statement Yes Yes
Independent auditors’ report with KAMs No Yes
Statement of added value Yes Yes
Statement of changes in net equity Yes Yes
KAMs = key audit matters.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Thus, from Table 2, it is noted that the main information 
that differentiates the QI from the SFS is the independent 
auditor’s report. For the QI, the auditing work is limited 
and obeys NBC CTA 18, of July 26th of 2013 (CFC, 2013) 
(disclosure of the independent auditor’s report and 
auditing procedures required in the case of resubmitting 
accounting statements or interim information), and the 
main differences are the less comprehensive review and 
the way the report is presented. The audit report disclosed 
in the set of SFSs presents the paragraph with the KAMs 
observed while carrying out the work, this paragraph not 
being disclosed in the QI.
Considering that the obligation to include KAMs 
came into effect in 2017 for the fiscal year ending in 
2016, the model that captures the variations will be 
used for a comparison between the returns relating to 
the information disclosed regarding 2015 and 2016. 
For this, the statistical model described in equation 1 is 
used, based on Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Beyer 
et al. (2010). 
in which the coefficient β1 indicates the effect for the 
disclosure of the set of SFSs and includes the independent 
auditor’s report with the KAMs, β2 indicates the effect for 
the disclosure of the information from the first quarter, 
β3 the effect for the disclosure of the information from 
the second quarter, β4 the effect for the disclosure of 
the information from the third quarter, β5 the effect for 
the disclosure of the other mandatory information, and 
β6 the effect for the disclosure of the other voluntary 
information. β1 is expected to present a statistically greater 
coefficient than that of the others. This is because, if the 
disclosure of the KAMs is relevant, it should increase the 
association between the cumulative abnormal returns in 
the event window of their disclosure and the abnormal 
returns of the company’s stocks. This model aims to 
analyze the variation occurring between the periods for 
the cumulative abnormal return of the different events. 
The intuition is that of the total cumulative abnormal 
return of year t relating to the information disclosed 
on date t, each one of the disclosure events (SFS, QI, 
mandatory disclosure, and voluntary disclosure) will 
show a positive association with the YEARi,tCar , and that with 
the introduction of KAMs, this association will be more 
relevant for the disclosure of the SFSs, it therefore being 
expected that coefficient β1 > βn > 0. Table 3 presents the 
description of each variation of the equation.
 1 
△ Car�,����� = β�+ β� △ Car�,����� + β� △ Car�,��
�� �� + β� △ Car�,��
�� �� + β� △ Car�,��
�� �� + 2 
β� △ Car���+ β� △ Car��� +  Σβ� △��������  (Roa, Surp���, Mv)�,� +ε�,� 3 
 4 
 5 
1
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Table 3
Description of the variables
Variables Description
YEAR
i,tCar Variation in the annual abnormal return between the periods (2017, 2016, and 2015)
SFS
i,t0Car
Variation in the annual abnormal return between the periods (2017, 2016, and 2015) in the disclosure window for the 
standardized financial statement on date t0
QI Q1
i,t1Car
Variation in the annual abnormal return between the periods (2017, 2016, and 2015) in the window in which there was 
disclosure of the QI relating to the first quarter on date t1
QI Q2
i,t 2Car
Variation in the annual abnormal return between the periods (2017, 2016, and 2015) in the window in which there was 
disclosure of the QI relating to the second quarter on date t2
QI Q3
i,t3Car
Variation in the annual abnormal return between the periods (2017, 2016, and 2015) in the window in which there was 
disclosure of the QI relating to the third quarter on date t3
OD
iCar
Variation in the abnormal return in the window in which there was disclosure of the mandatory information, as according 
to the classification established in Table 1
VDCari
Variation in the abnormal return in the window in which there was disclosure of the voluntary information, as according 
to the classification established in Table 1

Roa Variation in the return on assets between the periods (2017, 2016, and 2015)

Surp_ear
Variation in the earnings surprise between the periods (2017, 2016, and 2015). The earnings forecast presented in the 
previous period in comparison with the earnings of the current period was considered 

ln_mv Variation in the company’s market value between the periods (2017, 2016, and 2015)
QI = quarterly information.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns Calculation
For the abnormal returns, the market-adjusted return 
statistical model was considered; they were calculated by 
the difference between the observed return on the asset 
and the market return in the same period:
Ait = Rit – Rmt
in which Ait is the abnormal return on a stock in the period, 
Rit is the verified return on a stock in the same period, 
and Rmt is the return on the whole portfolio distributed 
via volume and trading of the asset in the same period.
The return on the stocks of all the companies listed on 
the B3 was calculated for all the days of the base-period 
by equation 3:
in which Rit is the rate of return on stock i in period t, 
considering as the period all the days on which the stock 
exchange was open in 2015, 2016, and 2017, and in 2018 
up to March 29th, Pt is the closing price of stock i on date 
t, and Pt-1 is the closing price of the stock on date t-1.
Next, the average market return was calculated by 
the sum of the return on the whole portfolio of assets 
weighted by its respective trading volume on date t in 
reais wit over the total market value on date t in reais Rt, 
as according to equation 4.
itRm =
3
t
t 1
R
=
∑
 . 
itw
To accumulate the abnormal returns on the stocks on 
the day of the event window, the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) was used, which is similar to that used by 
Beyer et al. (2010):
iCAR  ( 1 3t ,  t ) )= 
t3
it
t 1
A
=
∑
in which CARi is the cumulative return on the asset, t1 
is the first day of the event window, t3 is the last day of 
the event window, and Ait is the abnormal return on a 
stock in the period.
3.3 Annual CAR Calculation
Given the statistical model, the            variable 
measurement represents the accumulation of abnormal 
returns occurring in the whole of year t for company i. Yet, 
as each company discloses its SFSs relating to the previous 
period on a different date, which by rule must occur by 
March 31st of the subsequent fiscal year, the adjustment 
was made to contemplate this. To adjust the effect of the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the SFS window from 
other periods, the following equation was considered:
,Car
YEAR
i t  = 
year with no adjustemnt
i,tCar  - 
SFS 
i, tCar  + 
SFS
i,t 1Car +  
in which year with no adjustmenti,tCar  is the cumulative abnormal return 
on stock i in year t, SFS i,tCar is the cumulative abnormal return 
on stock i in the disclosure window for the SFS from the 
previous year disclosed in year t, and SFSi,t 1Car +  is the cumulative 
2
4
5
6
3( )t t 1it
t 1
P   PR  3
P
−
−
−
=
,Car
YEAR
i t
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abnormal return on stock i in the disclosure window for 
the SFS from year t disclosed in year t+1.
For a better understanding, the expressions used year-
to-year were:
YEAR
i,2015Car :
year with no adjustment 
i,2015Car  (abnormal return between 
01/01/2015 and 12/31/2015)
(-) SFS i, 2015Car  (abnormal return of the window in 
2015, in which there was disclosure of the financial 
statements from 2014)
(+) SFSi,2016Car  (abnormal return of the window in 
2016, in which there was disclosure of the financial 
statements from 2015)
YEAR
i,2016Car :
year with no adjustment
i,2016Car  (abnormal return between 
01/01/2016 and 12/31/2016)
(-) SFS i, 2016Car  (abnormal return of the window in 
2016, in which there was disclosure of the financial 
statements from 2015)
(+) SFSi,2017Car  (abnormal return of the window in 
2017, in which there was disclosure of the financial 
statements from 2016)
YEAR
i,2017Car :
year with no adjustment 
i,2017Car  (abnormal return between 
01/01/2017 and 12/31/2017) 
(-)  
SFS 
i, 2017Car   (abnormal return of the window in 2017, in which there was disclosure of the financial 
statements from 2016)
(+) SFSi,2018Car  (abnormal return of the window in 
2018, in which there was disclosure of the financial 
statements from 2017)
3.3.1 SFS CAR Calculation
To calculate the cumulative returns around the date 
of disclosure of the SFSs, their disclosure date was taken 
for all the publicly-held companies with stocks listed on 
the stock exchange. For the dates that for some reason 
did not fall on a working day, the next working day was 
always considered, which is when the market reacts to 
this information. Based on each company’s SFS disclosure 
date, the CAR of the event window was calculated, this 
being one day before and one day after the disclosure date. 
3.3.2 QI CAR Calculation
For each company, the disclosure date was taken of the 
three QI reports (first, second, and third quarters) relating 
to the period. The fourth quarter was not considered as it 
is already contemplated in the annual disclosure (SFS). For 
the dates that for some reason did not fall on a working 
day, the next working day was always considered, which 
is when the market reacts to this information. Based on 
the QI disclosure date, the CAR of the event window was 
calculated for each one of the quarters.
3.3.3 Mandatory CAR Calculation
Based on the classification of the disclosure categories, 
all the dates during the year on which the companies 
disclosed some mandatory information to the market were 
taken. For the dates that for some reason did not fall on 
working days, the next working day was always considered, 
which is when the market reacts to this information.
Each company has a set of mandatory disclosures that 
it must always disclose if that event occurs. For example, 
acts of extraordinary general meetings must be disclosed, 
but there is no specific periodicity. Thus, it is considered 
that these events can occur on non-specific dates and the 
returns around these events are calculated. In the case of 
the occurrence of more than one event, the returns around 
each one of the events are added up for consideration of 
the cumulative return. Therefore, based on the dates of 
disclosure of the mandatory information, the CAR of the 
event window for each disclosure was calculated and, 
then, all the CARs of these windows were added up to 
produce the OD0Car  variable.
3.3.4 Voluntary CAR Calculation
Based on the classification of the disclosure categories, 
all the days during the year on which the companies 
disclosed some voluntary information to the market were 
taken. For the dates that for some reason did not fall on a 
working day, the next working day was always considered, 
which is when the market reacts to this information. Based 
on the dates of disclosure of the voluntary information, 
the CAR of the event window for each disclosure was 
calculated and, then, all the CARs of the windows were 
added up to produce the VD0Car  variable.
3.4 Data Treatment
According to the proposed model, the return will 
be calculated based on the stocks and controlled by 
their trading code. Initially, the database retrieved from 
Economatica was composed of 753 companies, which add 
up to 1,271 stocks; after ignoring the companies that appear 
as “canceled” in the Economatica record, 577 stocks remain. 
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Table 4
Sampling base
Description Stocks
Companies listed on the Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3) 1,271
Canceled companies 694
Total database 577
Exclusion of the company classes with the least movement 263
Database for the analysis 314
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
For the companies with more than one stock listed on 
the stock exchange, the study concentrated on the most 
liquid stocks in the market.
For each stock, the daily closing price of the respective 
stock was taken from Economatica and, subsequently, 
the value of the return on the stock was calculated for 
the respective date. In the case of companies whose stock 
is not quoted every day, this was not considered for the 
purposes of return on that date.
Table 5
Data cleansing
Description 2015 2016 2017
Database for analysis 314 314 314
Stocks that were not traded in the SFS or QI disclosure window 69 76 76
Stocks that were not traded in the whole period 30 27 32
Companies with no market value 49 47 56
Companies that did not disclose earnings in one of the periods used to calculate the earnings surprise variable 17 17 34
Companies that did not present one of the variables in one of the periods, making it impossible to calculate the 
variation in the variables
18 16 22
Observations 131 131 94
SFS = standardized financial statement; QI = quarterly information.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
3.5 Control Variables
Given the fragility of the proposed model, since the audit 
report is disclosed with various different pieces of financial 
and accounting information and even future management 
projections, the following controls were considered to 
eliminate and minimize the possible distortion effects.
 y ROA: the return on assets obtained by the following 
equation: 
ROA = Net Earningst /Total Assetst-1
∆ROA is the variation in the return on assets of the 
company from one year in relation to another.
 y SURP_EAR: earnings surprise (SURP_EAR) was 
considered as the difference between the current 
period’s earnings in relation to the earnings from 
the same period of the previous year divided by the 
absolute value of the current period’s earnings. Thus, 
the surprise was measured according to the equation:
Surprise = real t 10 0EAR EAR −−  / | real0EAR |
in which real0EAR  is the actual net earnings in the period and 
t 1
0EAR
−  is the actual net earnings in the previous period.
 y ∆Ear_dummy: represents a dummy variable that is 
1 if the company had net earnings and 0 otherwise.
 y MV: is the market value of the company’s net equity on 
the closing date of the fiscal year. The value is obtained 
via the following equation:
MV = total stocks * unadjusted prices 
for annual proceeds
For companies with more than one class of stock, the 
formula is:
MV = price class A * quantity class A 
+ price class B * quantity class B
 y The ∆lnMV variable represents the difference in the 
Naperian logarithm of the company’s market value in 
period t in relation to the Naperian logarithm of the 
company’s market value in period t-1. Specifically, 
we have: 1 
����� � ���𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�� � ���𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚���� 2 
 3 
 4 
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression. Under analysis, it is observed that 
the means of the variation variables of the CAR are greater than the medians, suggesting an asymmetric distribution 
of the variations in the returns.
Table 6
Descriptive statistic of the variables
Variable Obs. Mean Median Stand. deviation 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile
YEAR
i,tCar (%) 225 34.83 28.60 88.65 -7.01 70.42
SFS
i,tCar (%) 225 -0.53 -0.65 8.64 -5.76 3.84
VDCar (%) 225 6.15 3.19 37.52 -11.23 20.14
ODCar (%) 225 15.95 8.82 73.76 -17.44 43.82
QI Q1
i,tCar (%) 225 0.61 0.37 9.26 -3.96 5.10
QI Q2
i,tCar (%) 225 1.43 0.79 8.64 -3.42 6.55
QI Q3
i,tCar (%) 225 -1.36 -0.06 9.24 -6.46 4.17
Surp _ ear (%) 225 0.96 0.05 28.69 -0.63 1.49
Surp _ earEar_dummy 225 -0.03 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00
Surp _ earroa (%) 225 0.24 -0.10 14.86 -2.60 2.00
Surp _ earln_Mv 225 0.30 0.26 0.46 0.06 0.51
Note: The variables refer to company i, year t, and are expressed in percentages, with the exception of the ∆ Ear_dummy and  
∆ ln_MV variables. i,t
YEARCar , ,
SFS
i tCar , 0
VDCar , 0  
ODCar and  1,
QI Q
i tCar , 
 2
,
QI Q
i tCar , 
 3
,
QI Q
i tCar  are the metrics used to capture 
the variation in the abnormal return of the windows between the periods of the events. i,t
YEARCar  is understood as the variation 
in the annual abnormal return; ,
SFS
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return on stock i in the disclosure window of the annual 
standardized financial statement; 0
VDCar  is the variation in the abnormal returns of the windows in which there was voluntary 
disclosure of information; 0
ODCar  is the variation in the abnormal returns of the windows in which there was mandatory 
disclosure;  1,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) from 
the first quarter;  2,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) 
from the second quarter;  3,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information 
(QI) from the third quarter; ∆Surp_ear is the variation in the earnings surprise; ∆Ear_dummy is a dummy variable that is 1 if 
the company had net earnings and 0 otherwise; ∆ROA is the variation in the return on assets; ∆ln_MV is the variation in the 
Naperian logarithm of the company’s market value. All the variations were calculated with relation to the same period of the 
previous year. The Winsor method was used to minimize the effect of the outliers on the ROA variable (2.5% in each tail of the 
distribution). 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In addition, the correlation was evaluated between the 
variables used in this study in order to identify possible 
signs of multicollinearity. No relationships were found 
that could indicate high multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables of this study. Table 7 presents the 
results.
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Table 7
Correlation analysis
△CarYEAR △CarSFS △CarVD △CarOD △CarQIQ1 △CarQIQ2 △CarQIQ3 ∆Surp_ ear ∆Ear_ dummy ∆roa ∆ln_MV
△CarYEAR 1.000
△CarSFS 0.292 1.000
△CarVD 0.307 -0.062 1.000
△CarOD 0.632 0.082 0.443 1.000
△CarQIQ1 0.316 0.094 0.076 0.099 1.000
△CarQIQ2 0.378 0.044 0.100 0.317 0.194 1.000
△CarQIQ3 0.087 0.088 0.131 0.085 0.031 -0.029 1.000
∆Surp_ ear 0.224 0.111 0.033 0.092 0.149 0.129 -0.051 1.000
∆Ear_ 
dummy
0.043 -0.033 0.131 0.032 0.021 -0.011 -0.020 0.122 1.000
∆roa 0.164 0.087 0.197 0.225 -0.007 0.051 0.160 0.108 0.413 1.000
∆ln_MV 0.314 -0.101 0.293 0.259 -0.007 0.037 0.126 0.068 0.134 0.118 1.000
Note: The variables refer to company i, year t, and are expressed in percentages, with the exception of the  ∆ Ear_dummy and  
∆ ln_MV variables. YEARi,tCar , ,SFSi tCar , 0VDCar , 0ODCar  and  1,QI Qi tCar ,  2,QI Qi tCar ,  3,QI Qi tCar  are the metrics used to capture the 
variation in the abnormal return of the windows between the periods of the events. YEARi,tCar  is understood as the variation in 
the annual abnormal return; ,
SFS
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return on stock i in the disclosure window of the annual 
standardized financial statement; 0
VDCar  is the variation in the abnormal returns of the windows in which there was voluntary 
disclosure of information; 0
ODCar  is the variation in the abnormal returns of the windows in which there was mandatory 
disclosure;  1,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) from 
the first quarter;  2,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) 
from the second quarter;  3,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information 
(QI) from the third quarter; ∆Surp_ear is the variation in the earnings surprise; ∆Ear_dummy is a dummy variable that is 1 if 
the company had net earnings and 0 otherwise; ∆ROA is the variation in the return on assets; ∆ln_MV is the variation in the 
Naperian logarithm of the company’s market value. All the variations were calculated with relation to the same period of the 
previous year. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
4.2 Regression Results
Table 8 presents the results of the regression of equation 
1, taking into consideration the full sample period. 
Considering that disclosure of KAMs became mandatory 
in 2016, the variations in the CAR were calculated for 
each one of the disclosure events of the companies from 
this period onward in relation to the previous period. 
Equation 1 seeks to verify whether, even controlling for 
other factors, the variations in the returns associated 
with disclosure of SFSs adopting KAMs have a greater 
association with the variation in the abnormal returns 
of other information disclosed by the company, whether 
mandatory or voluntary. The idea of this association 
is presented by Beyer et al. (2010) in an evaluation of 
the quarterly break-down of the variance in the return 
of American companies in relation to their disclosure 
events. The research design was adapted to try and identify 
whether the inclusion of KAMs in the disclosure of SFSs 
would provide any additional information to the market. 
Thus, the variations in the cumulative returns of the 
disclosure events were used, considering that when there 
is an increase in information, the coefficient relating to the 
new information provided by the KAMs contained in the 
SFSs should be significant and greater than the coefficient 
of the other information disclosed by the companies, 
especially the interim financial statements that do not 
have a full independent auditor’s report.
Based on Table 8, and in line with the research 
hypothesis, we have a coefficient of the SFSi,tCar  variable 
of 2.44, which is significant at 1%, showing a positive 
effect on the association between the variation in the 
return around the SFS disclosure and the variation in 
the cumulative return for the year, suggesting that much 
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of the variability in the returns on a company’s stocks 
derives from the returns occurring around the date of 
the SFS disclosure. The coefficient comparison tests 
(β1 > βn > 0) show that the results are stronger for the 
differences between the coefficients of the SFS and third 
quarter information, other mandatory information, and 
voluntary information. Thus, evidence is found that the 
disclosure of SFSs with the new content of the independent 
auditor’s report from 2016 onward has informational 
content that is additional to the other mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure events analyzed in this study. The 
coefficient relating to the mandatory disclosure is 0.57 and 
significant at 1%. It is also observed that the coefficients of 
the disclosure window of the first and second quarters are 
significant, while the coefficient relating to the voluntary 
disclosures is not significant. 
Table 8
Results of the regression
Dep. variable
,
ANO
i tCar Coefficient
Robust standard 
error
t p>|t| CI95%
Constant 11.66** 4.37 2.67 0.01 3.06 20.27
SFS
i,tCar (%) 2.44*** 0.41 5.97 0.00 1.63 3.24
VD
0Car (%) 0.05 0.15 0.31 0.76 -0.26 0.35
OD
0Car (%) 0.57*** 0.07 8.13 0.00 0.43 0.71
QI Q1
i,tCar (%) 1.94** 0.70 2.79 0.01 0.57 3.32
QI Q2
i,tCar (%) 1.61* 0.89 1.82 0.07 -0.14 3.35
QI Q3
i,tCar (%) 0.01 0.60 0.02 0.98 -1.17 1.20
∆Surp_ear (%) 0.28 0.23 1.2 0.23 -0.18 0.73
∆Ear_dummy -0.98 9.96 -0.1 0.92 -20.61 18.65
∆roa (%) -0.03 0.42 -0.08 0.94 -0.86 0.80
∆ln_VM 38.20** 17.01 2.25 0.03 4.67 71.72
Adj. R2 (%) 58.12
F-Stat 32.67
Obs. 225
Note: This table presents the coefficient, p-value, and significance of the regression model of equation 1. The variables refer to 
company i, year t, and are expressed in percentages, with the exception of the ∆Ear_dummy and ∆ln_VM variables. YEARi,tCar , 
,
SFS
i tCar , 0
VDCar , 0
ODCar  and  1,
QI Q
i tCar , 
 2
,
QI Q
i tCar , 
 3
,
QI Q
i tCar  are the metrics used to capture the variation in the abnormal return of the 
windows between the periods of the events. i,t
YEARCar  is understood as the variation in the annual abnormal return; ,
SFS
i tCar  is the 
variation in the abnormal return on stock i in the disclosure window of the annual standardized financial statement; 0
VDCar  is the 
variation in the abnormal returns of the windows in which there was voluntary disclosure of information; 0
ODCar  is the variation 
in the abnormal returns of the windows in which there was mandatory disclosure;  1,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return 
of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) from the first quarter;  2,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return 
of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) from the second quarter;  3,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal 
return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) from the third quarter; ∆Surp_ear is the variation in the earnings 
surprise; ∆Ear_dummy is a dummy variable that is 1 if the company had net earnings and 0 otherwise; ∆ROA is the variation in 
the return on assets; ∆ln_MV is the variation in the Naperian logarithm of the company’s market value. All the variations were 
calculated with relation to the same period of the previous year. The Winsor method was used to minimize the effect of the outliers 
on the ROA variable (2.5% in each tail of the distribution). 
*, **, *** = 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively.
CI95% = 95% confidence interval.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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The coefficients of the QI Q1i,tCar , QI Q2i,tCar , and QI Q3i,tCar  
variables are responsible for capturing the association of 
the variation in the abnormal return around the disclosure 
windows for the quarterly reports. The differences between 
the coefficients found for SFSi,tCar  and QI Q1i,tCar , QI Q2i,tCar  
and QI Q3i,tCar  are positive, but significant only in the case 
of the third quarter. 
In general, the results suggest that the KAMs have 
informational relevance and contribute to the investors’ 
analyses. These results are aligned with Christensen 
et al. (2014), who state that investors who receive 
a KAM paragraph are more likely to change their 
investment decisions than investors who receive a 
standardized audit report; in other words, they increase 
the confidence theory of Cordoş and Fülöp (2015).
In addition, Table 9 presents the comparison between 
the result of the regression, considering the periods from 
2015 to 2016 (first adoption period) and 2016 to 2017 as 
subsamples of the previous analysis.
Table 9
Results of the regression – Comparison between 2016 and 2017
Dep. var.: 
,
YEAR
i tCar
2016-2015 2017-2016
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
SFS
i,tCar (%) 2.42*** 0.00 2,09*** 0,00
0Car
VD

(%) 0.02 0.72 0.13 0.41
OD
0Car (%) 0.62*** 0.00 0.37*** 0.00
QI Q1
i,tCar (%) 2.52*** 0.00 0.98 0.11
QI Q2
i,tCar (%) 2.35** 0.04 -0.24 0.62
QI Q3
i,tCar (%) -0.01 0.99 1.21** 0.02
∆Surp_ear (%) 0.24 0.99 -0.01 0.99
∆Ear_dummy 0.98 0.94 17.86** 0.07
∆roa (%) 0.075 0.87 -1.21*** 0.00
∆ln_MV 34.12 0.28 48.01*** 0.00
Constant 18.38*** 0.00 -5.95 0.291
Adj. R2 (%) 63.79 55.74
F-Stat 28.63 11.92
Obs. 131 94
Note: This table presents the coefficient, p-value, and significance of the regression model of equation 1. The variables refer to 
company i, year t, and are expressed in percentages, with the exception of the ∆Ear_dummy and ∆ln_VM variables. YEARi,tCar , 
,
SFS
i tCar , 0
VDCar , 0
ODCar  and  1,
QI Q
i tCar , 
 2
,
QI Q
i tCar , 
 3
,
QI Q
i tCar  are the metrics used to capture the variation in the abnormal 
return of the windows between the periods of the events. YEARi,tCar  is understood as the variation in the annual abnormal return; 
,
SFS
i tCar  is the variation in the abnormal return on stock i in the disclosure window of the annual standardized financial statement; 
0
VDCar  is the variation in the abnormal returns of the windows in which there was voluntary disclosure of information; 0
ODCar  
is the variation in the abnormal returns of the windows in which there was mandatory disclosure;  1,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the 
abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) from the first quarter;  2,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in the 
abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) from the second quarter;  3,
QI Q
i tCar  is the variation in 
the abnormal return of the disclosure window for the quarterly information (QI) from the third quarter; ∆Surp_ear is the variation 
in the earnings surprise; ∆Ear_dummy is a dummy variable that is 1 if the company had net earnings and 0 otherwise; ∆ROA is 
the variation in the return on assets; ∆ln_MV is the variation in the Naperian logarithm of the company’s market value. All the 
variations were calculated with relation to the same period of the previous year. The Winsor method was used to minimize the 
effect of the outliers on the ROA variable (2.5% in each tail of the distribution). 
*, **, *** = 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Table 9 also shows that the coefficient of the 
            variable is significant for both subsamples and its 
coefficient shows that, in the first year of the inclusion 
of KAMs, there was a greater variation around the 
SFS disclosure window than in the following year. It 
is also noted that the coefficient of the OD0Car  variable 
in both periods is significant at 1%. From carrying out 
the coefficient comparison tests (β1 > βn > 0), we can 
see that for both subsamples the coefficient of the SFS 
disclosure is greater than the coefficients of the voluntary 
and mandatory information, but there are results 
that vary when compared with the coefficients of the 
information disclosed in the quarterly reports. Thus, it 
can be seen that the accounting information disclosed 
in the quarterly reports is incorporated into the returns 
on the stocks, but the information disclosed in the SFSs 
including KAMs plays a relevant and consistent role in the 
composition of the cumulative abnormal returns on the 
Brazilian companies’ stocks, and it is the only variable that 
maintained a significant coefficient in all the specifications. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper aimed to empirically investigate whether the 
KAMs introduced in the independent auditor’s report as of 
the 2016 fiscal year have provided informational relevance 
for investors in the Brazilian market. The informational 
relevance was analyzed using the cumulative abnormal return 
on the dates of the respective disclosure of the audit report.
In general, the results of this study indicate a positive 
and consistent association between the coefficient of the 
relationship between the variation in the cumulative 
abnormal returns in the disclosure window for the financial 
statements with the auditor’s report that includes KAMs 
and the variation in the company’s annual abnormal 
returns. In addition, we can observe some results that 
indicate an incremental positive association in relation to 
the association between the other financial information 
(mandatory and voluntary) and the variation in the 
returns from the same period.  
This result supports this study’s hypothesis, 
demonstrating that, since the disclosure of financial 
statements containing the audit report with KAMs, 
there has been a significant explanation of the cumulative 
abnormal returns in the year based on the cumulative 
returns around the SFS disclosure date.
According to the results indicated, it is verified that 
the inclusion of KAMs has informational relevance by 
comparing the behaviors of the abnormal returns with 
those obtained in the period immediately before. These 
results support the findings in the studies elaborated by 
Christensen et al. (2014) and Cordoş and Fülöp (2015) 
and go against the results found by Bédard et al. (2014).
This paper fills a gap in the literature, based on its 
empirical evidence regarding the informational relevance of 
the content of the audit report, especially from the adoption 
of KAMs, considering that many studies elaborated on 
the topic with an emphasis on informational relevance 
have been based on applying questionnaires to students. 
Standing out as a limitation of these results is the 
possibility of there being other non-controlled effects 
that influenced the volatility of the stock prices and their 
respective daily returns. It is also worth highlighting that 
some comparison tests of the coefficients associated with the 
disclosure of the SFSs and QI reports were not significant, 
showing that the quarterly accounting information, even if 
it is not fully audited, has relevance for the market agents. 
For new studies, we suggest widening the results 
detected in this study, especially by working with more 
periods and comparing the information that is repeating 
in the following years, or even verifying whether the 
auditing firms are following a standard and using the 
same KAM texts for other companies they audit. Another 
important factor to be analyzed is whether the auditor’s 
independence is being influenced with the scope of the 
audit report, as foreseen in the studies by Brown et al. 
(2014) and Gimbar, Hasen, and Ozlanski (2016).
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